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Ebola, Quarantine, and Flawed CDC Policy
Robert Gatter *
The CDC’s Interim Guidance for Monitoring and Movements of
Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure is deeply flawed
because it disregards the science of Ebola transmission. It
recommends that officials quarantine individuals exposed to the
virus but who do not have any symptoms of illness, ignoring the
fact that only those with Ebola symptoms can communicate the
virus to others. Consequently, any quarantine order based on the
Guidance is surely unconstitutional and illegal under most
states’ public health statutes—as exemplified by the State of
Maine’s failed petition to quarantine Nurse Kaci Hickox in
October 2014. This article examines the Guidance and events
surrounding its creation to explore why the CDC issued
quarantine recommendations that lack scientific foundation. It
also catalogues the costs of doing so, concluding that the
Guidance undermines rather than serves population health.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 2
A. THE CDC’S GUIDANCE ......................................................................... 5
B. THE SCIENCE OF EBOLA TRANSMISSION .............................................. 8
C. THE LAW ............................................................................................ 11
D. THE GUIDANCE IN CONTEXT .............................................................. 15
1. Thomas Eric Duncan ................................................................... 16
2. Nurses Pham and Vinson............................................................. 17
3. Dr. Craig Spencer and Nurse Kaci Hickox ................................. 19
4. Theoretical Risks of Transmission ............................................... 21
E. THE MANY COSTS OF ACCOMMODATING FEAR IN PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICY .............................................................................. 22

*
Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis
University School of Law and Professor of Health Management and Policy, Saint Louis
University College for Public Health and Social Justice. Special thanks to Srishti Miglani,
faculty fellow extraordinaire, for her assistance.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2598303

2

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1

My approach is to figure out what works, get it done and
base it all on data.
Tom Frieden, MD, M.P.H.
Director, CDC

INTRODUCTION
Remember Kaci Hickox? She is the nurse who volunteered to treat
Ebola patients in a disease-stricken West African nation, and then
dominated the news when she fought against efforts by two states to
quarantine 1 her after she returned home symptom-free.
You might remember how she stood up to New Jersey Governor
Chris Christie, who had mandated the quarantine of everyone who
treated Ebola patients, even those who could not transmit Ebola to others
because they did not have any symptoms of the disease. 2 Christie applied
this mandate to Hickox when she returned to the U.S. through Newark
Liberty International Airport.3 When New Jersey’s policy was criticized
on the grounds that it ignored the science of Ebola transmission, Christie
claimed he was acting “out of an abundance of caution.” 4 Hickox,
sounding more like a seasoned politico than a nurse, quipped that the
governor seemed to be acting “out of an abundance of politics.”5
Almost certainly, you would recognize two famous photos of her.
One is a quarantine-selfie taken from a tent erected in a parking lot of the
Newark hospital where she was being held against her will.6 In the
1

Throughout this article, I use the word “quarantine” to include both the complete
separation of one exposed to Ebola from those who have not been exposed (e.g., the kind
of quarantine imposed by New Jersey on Kaci Hickox) and the near-complete separation
of one exposed to Ebola from those who have not been exposed, which allows the person
exposed to be with others so long as she is not within three feet of any non-exposed
person (e.g., the kind of quarantine that Maine sought to impose on Kaci Hickox).
2
Leslie Savan, Nurse Kaci Hickox Takes on Bully Governors Christie, Cuomo and
LePage, THE NATION (Oct. 29, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/186681/
nurse-kaci-hickox-takes-bully-governors-christie-cuomo-and-lepage#.
3
Anemona Hartocollis & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Tested Negative, Nurse Criticizes
Her Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2014, at A1.
4
Susan Cornwall, Maine Nurse Sees Ebola Quarantines as ‘Abundance of Politics’,
REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/02/us-healthebola-usa-idUSKBN0IM0PR20141102.
5
Id.
6
See Frank Rosario & Joe Tacopino, Ebola Nurse’s Quarantine Hell, N.Y. POST (Oct.
27, 2014, 1:27 AM), available at http://nypost.com/2014/10/27/ebola-nurse-gets-prisontreatment-in-quarantine-hell/.
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photo, Hickox is wearing a patient’s gown, and we see that the Spartan
shelter behind her is a makeshift hospital room. 7 The second photo was
taken a week or so later after Nurse Hickox had returned to her home in
Fort Kent, Maine. In it, she is riding a bike in front of her house,
indicating that she would not quarantine herself voluntarily despite a
request by Maine health officials that she do so for another two weeks
until the incubation period for the Ebola virus expired.8
You might even remember that, following this defiant bike ride, the
State of Maine petitioned a court for a quarantine order against Hickox.9
The Court rejected the petition as unnecessary to safeguard the public’s
health because Hickox was symptom-free, and only those with Ebola
symptoms pose a risk of transmission. 10
Unnoticed or forgotten during this time was the Interim U.S.
Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola
Virus Exposure (the “Guidance”). 11 It is authored by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the most authoritative public
health agency in the country, if not the world. The CDC released the
Guidance publically on October 29, 2014, 12 the day before the State of
Maine filed its petition for a quarantine order.13
The Guidance recommends that state and local health agencies
monitor and effectively quarantine even asymptomatic individuals, who,
like Hickox, were exposed directly to the Ebola virus while in countries
where the disease is widespread and while wearing appropriate
protective equipment. 14
Maine’s health officials and lawyers attached the Guidance to the
State’s petition. 15 The petition correctly assessed that the Guidance
placed Nurse Hickox in the category of having “some risk” of becoming
7

See id.
Nurse Defies Ebola Quarantine in Maine, Rides Bike, CBS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2014,
1:52 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-nurse-kaci-hickox-defies-quarantine-inmaine-goes-on-bike-ride/.
9
See Verified Petition for Public Health Order, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (Me.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Petition], http://courts.maine.gov/news_reference/
high_profile/hickox.shtml.
10
Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct. Oct.
31, 2014) [hereinafter Order Pending Hearing], http://courts.maine.gov/news_reference/
high_profile/hickox.shtml.
11
See CDC, INTERIM U.S. GUIDANCE FOR MONITORING AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
WITH POTENTIAL EBOLA VIRUS EXPOSURE (December 24, 2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE].
The Guidance has been updated and amended by CDC since its initial publication.
12
See id.
13
See Petition, supra note 9.
14
See GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9 (referencing table addressing “some risk”
category and “asymptomatic” clinical criteria).
15
See Petition, supra note 9, Exhibit A.
8
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ill with Ebola herself,16 and it sought an order that was based nearly
word-for-word on the relevant recommendations of the Guidance. 17
So how could a court reject Maine’s petition? After all, it was based
not only on the recommendation of the State’s chief health officer, but
also on the express recommendations of the nation’s leading public
health agency. How can a state judge, without any public health
expertise, rule that a quarantine order grounded squarely on the
recommendations of the CDC was not necessary to protect the public
against the spread of Ebola?
The answer is as shocking as it is simple. The recommendations in
the CDC’s Guidance lack a basis in the science of Ebola transmission.
Nobody can transmit Ebola to another person unless and until symptoms
of the disease appear. 18 The CDC, itself, says so. According to the
agency’s educational materials for the public, an individual “can only get
Ebola from [t]ouching the blood or body fluids of a person who is sick
with or has died from Ebola.” 19 So, even if we knew that an individual
was infected with Ebola, that person would not pose any risk of
transmission to anyone until after the virus had incubated fully and after
the person began experiencing symptoms of the illness. Given this fact,
quarantining someone who, like Hickox, does not display any symptoms
of illness does not serve a public health purpose; instead, it unnecessarily
separates from others a person who poses no health risk to the
community, no matter how likely it is that such a person develops
symptoms in the future.
Accordingly, the Guidance’s recommendation to severely restrict an
asymptomatic person’s contact with others is irrational because it
contradicts the science. The CDC’s recommended restrictions, as applied
to Nurse Hickox, so clearly lacked a foundation in the scientific facts
about Ebola transmission that the Maine court had no choice but to
disregard the CDC’s Guidance, and thus reject that portion of the State’s
petition.
The real question is why the CDC included these recommendations
in the Guidance in the first place. It is unfathomable that the CDC’s
experts were not aware that the agency’s recommended public health
actions lacked a basis in the science of Ebola transmission. There must
16

Id. ¶¶ 25-27.
Compare id. ¶ 35 with GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9 (showing recommended
“public health action” for “asymptomatic” individuals in the “some risk” category).
18
See Facts about Ebola in the U.S., CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/
infographic.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); see also Review of Human-to-Human
Transmission of Ebola Virus, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/humantransmission.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
19
See CDC, Facts about Ebola in the U.S., supra note 18.
17
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be some other explanation, such as political pressure to stop the rising
tide of fear, or perhaps the CDC silently suspected that this strain of the
virus was more easily transmissible than earlier strains with which
experts had experience.
This article argues that, regardless of its reasons, the CDC may have
fundamentally damaged its credibility, and that of health officials
everywhere, by issuing recommendations in its Guidance that are
unsupported by science. The price of doing so is the erosion of public
health authority, which, ultimately, erodes population health.

A. THE CDC’S GUIDANCE
The real protagonists of this story are not Nurse Hickox or Governor
Christie. Rather, they are the CDC and its Ebola Guidance. The
Guidance creates a matrix of recommendations20 for public health
officials about whether to monitor or restrict the movements of
individuals exposed to the Ebola virus and, if so, to what degree.21 The
matrix first divides individuals into four categories based on the
likelihood that they will become sick with Ebola—high risk, some risk,
low risk, and no identifiable risk. 22 Again, these categories refer to the
risk that the individual will become sick with Ebola, not the far more
relevant risk that an individual will infect someone else. In other words,
the matrix is flawed from the outset because it is based on the risk of
illness, and not on the risk of transmission.
The Guidance further sub-divides each of these risk categories based
on whether an individual has symptoms of illness or is asymptomatic. 23
Thus, the Guidance creates eight categories and eight corresponding sets
of recommendations with respect to monitoring or restricting the
movements of individuals. For example, there are recommendations for
those who are deemed to be at “high risk” for becoming sick with Ebola
and who also have certain clinical symptoms; another set for those who
are deemed to be at “high risk” for becoming sick with Ebola but who
are asymptomatic; another set for those who are deemed to be at “some

20

The Guidance is exactly that—guidance. It is a recommendation or a statement of
policy that is issued by the CDC, as a federal agency. As such, it is exempt from even
informal, notice-and-comment rule-making procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2014).
Consequently, the Guidance does not have the force of law. See e.g., Prof’ls and Patients
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1995).
21
See GUIDANCE, supra note 11.
22
Id. at 9-12.
23
Id.
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risk” and have certain clinical symptoms; and still another for those who
are deemed to be at “some risk,” but who are symptom-free, and so on. 24
The monitoring recommendations that correspond with each
category range from no monitoring to active monitoring (where public
health authorities regularly inquire about the individual’s temperature
and other clinical symptoms) to direct active monitoring (where public
health officials directly observe the individual and determine what, if
any, clinical symptoms exist).25 The Guidance recommends direct active
monitoring for all asymptomatic individuals in the “high risk” and “some
risk” categories. 26 “High risk” individuals include those who have had
direct contact with the blood or bodily fluids of someone sick with
Ebola, those who have lived with a person sick with Ebola, and those
who have handled the body of someone who died from Ebola. 27 Those
with “some risk” of contracting Ebola include individuals who, while in
countries where Ebola is widespread, have had direct contact with
someone sick with Ebola while wearing personal protective equipment,
as well as those who have had prolonged contact with a person sick with
Ebola in the patient’s home, in a health care facility, or in a community
setting. 28 The Guidance recommends only active monitoring for
asymptomatic individuals in the “low risk” category, which includes
those who have been in a country with widespread Ebola within the past
twenty-one days, but who had no known exposures; those who have had
brief direct contact (e.g., shaking hands) with a person with Ebola, while
the person was in the early stage of the disease; those who have had brief
proximity (e.g., briefly being in the same room) with a person with
Ebola, while the person was symptomatic; those who come into direct
contact with a person sick with Ebola, while wearing personal protective
equipment while in countries without widespread Ebola; and those who
have traveled on an aircraft with a person with Ebola, while the person
was symptomatic. 29 Finally, no monitoring at all is recommended for
those who have had no known exposure and are experiencing no
symptoms of any illness. 30
24

Id.
See id. at 2 (distinguishing active and direct active monitoring).
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id. at 9.
28
Id. at 10.
29
Id. at 11 (recommending, as an exception, direct active monitoring for individuals
who have traveled on an aircraft and sat within three feet of someone who was
symptomatic with Ebola).
30
Id. at 12. Of course, monitoring recommendations only apply to those who are
asymptomatic because the purpose of monitoring is to determine if and when a person
without symptoms of Ebola becomes symptomatic for the disease. Once a person has
Ebola symptoms, monitoring gives way to isolation and treatment.
25
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Central to this story, however, are recommendations in the Guidance
for restricting the movements of asymptomatic individuals in the “high
risk” and “some risk” categories, which are so substantial that they
closely resemble a complete quarantine. 31 They include:
•
[E]xclusion from long-distance commercial
conveyances (aircraft, ship, train, bus) or local public
conveyances (e.g., bus, subway);
•
Exclusion from public places (e.g., shopping
centers, movie theaters), and congregate gatherings;
•
Exclusion from workplaces for the duration of a
public health order, unless approved by the state or local
health department (telework is permitted);
•
Non-congregate
public
activities
while
maintaining a 3-foot distance from others may be
permitted (e.g., jogging in a park); . . .
•
Any travel will be coordinated with public
health authorities to ensure uninterrupted direct active
monitoring;
•
Federal public health travel restrictions (Do Not
Board) may be implemented based on an assessment of
the particular circumstance . . . . 32
No movement restrictions are recommended under the Guidance for
either the “low risk” or “no risk” categories.33
In short, the Guidance recommends that individuals in the “high
risk” and “some risk” categories be restricted from traveling, working,
going to public places, or otherwise coming within three feet of another
person. The only thing separating such a person from someone who is
“quarantined” appears to be that the “patient” may go for a walk or jog in
a location so isolated as to not risk coming within three feet of someone
else and may drive to that isolated jogging spot alone if public health
officials are notified of the plan. In essence, this is house-arrest with
limited solo-driving and solo-jogging privileges.
31
The Guidance distinguishes between controlling movement and quarantining
individuals by giving these actions separate definitions. See GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at
3. Oddly, the Guidance defines “quarantine” and then never uses that term outside of the
definition section of the document.
32
GUIDANCE, supra note 11, at 9-10.
33
Id. at 11-12.
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These are the restrictions that the State of Maine sought to impose on
Kaci Hickox based upon a straight-forward application of the
Guidance. 34 At the time, she fell into the “some risk” category because
she had come into direct contact with several people sick with Ebola
while she was in Sierra Leone (a country where Ebola was widespread),
and while she was wearing personal protective equipment. 35 Moreover,
at the time of Maine’s petition, Nurse Hickox did not have any
symptoms of Ebola, but she was still within the twenty-one day
incubation period of the virus.36 Within the structure of the Guidance’s
matrix, she fell into the category for asymptomatic individuals who have
“some risk” of becoming sick with Ebola themselves. Correspondingly,
the Guidance recommended that she be subject to direct active
monitoring and that her movements be restricted such that she would not
come within three feet of another person for the remainder of the
incubation period.
As described next, the restrictions on movements for asymptomatic
individuals recommended by the Guidance do not have a basis in the
science of Ebola transmission. Accordingly, they violate a fundamental
principle of public health practice and public health law that actions
taken to protect population health be based in scientific fact.

B. THE SCIENCE OF EBOLA TRANSMISSION
Ebola is a hemorrhagic fever virus, which means that it infects and
overwhelms vascular cells, causing them to burst and bleed.37 By
severely damaging the vascular system, the illness undermines the
body’s ability to regulate itself or mount an effective immune response,
resulting in multi-organ system failure and death.38 Ebola is a
particularly lethal hemorrhagic fever, causing death in fifty to ninety
percent of those it infects.39

34

See Petition, supra note 9, ¶ 35.
Id. ¶¶ 26-29.
36
Id. ¶ 26.
37
See Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers: Fact Sheet, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/
spb/mnpages/dispages/Fact_Sheets/Viral_Hemorrhagic_Fevers_Fact_Sheet.pdf;
Nat’l
Inst. of Health, Hemorrhagic Fevers, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/hemorrhagicfevers.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2015); Ruth Tam, This is How
You Get Ebola, As Explained by Science, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:24 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/know-enemy/; Meghana H. Raykar et al., Ebola
Virus Disease, 3 PHARMTECHMEDICA 493, 493 (July-Aug. 2014).
38
Raykar, supra note 37, at 493.
39
See id.
35
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The virus is not easily transmitted from one human to another.
Unlike an influenza or cold virus, it is not airborne, 40 meaning that it
does not “hang in the air” for long periods of time, and so it cannot be
breathed in by another person. 41 Instead, it is only spread as a result of
contact with the bodily fluids of one who is in the throes of the illness.
The CDC says that Ebola is transmitted:
through direct contact (through broken skin or mucous
membranes in, for example, the eyes, nose, or mouth)
with:
• blood or body fluids (including but not limited
to urine, saliva, sweat, feces, vomit, breast milk, and
semen) of a person who is sick with Ebola
• objects (like needles and syringes) that have
been contaminated with the virus
• infected fruit bats or primates (apes and
monkeys)
Ebola is not spread through the air, by water, or in
general, by food.42
These limited routes of communication explain why those infected with
Ebola are health care workers who have cared for sick and dying Ebola
patients in hospitals, or family members and others who have cared for
sick and dying Ebola patients in their homes, or those who have prepared
for burial the bodies of deceased Ebola victims. 43
Meanwhile, individuals exposed to the Ebola virus, but who do not
yet have symptoms of the illness, have never transmitted the virus to
others. Since 1976, when Ebola was first discovered in humans, there
have been twenty-five reported outbreaks, including the 2014 epidemic,
40

See Ebola Transmission, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transmission/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2015).
41
See What We Know about Transmission of the Ebola Virus Among Humans, WHO
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/06-october-2014/en/; Tom
Howell Jr., CDC Throws Cold Water on Talk of ‘Airborne’ Ebola Transmission, WASH.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/1/
cdc-dismisses-talk-airborne-ebola-transmission/. While there has been speculation about
the possibility that the current strain of Ebola circulating in West Africa could mutate so
as to become airborne, see e.g., Michael T. Osterholm, What We’re Afraid to Say About
Ebola, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, at A31, there is no evidence that the current strain is
airborne.
42
Ebola Transmission, supra note 40.
43
See id.; Tam, supra note 37, at 4.
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which is the largest. 44 From those outbreaks there have been 16,242
confirmed cases of human Ebola infection, 45 and that number could be
closer to 25,000 once additional suspected and probable cases are
confirmed. 46 Not one of these cases has resulted from contact with a
person who did not have symptoms of the illness. Not one.
No wonder the CDC, in its public education materials, identifies
“[t]ouching the blood or body fluids of a person who is sick with or has
died from Ebola” as the “only” way to become infected with the virus. 47
An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, criticizing the
policy of quarantining health care workers who treat Ebola patients in
West Africa, put a finer point on the power of our experience with the
virus to explain how it is transmitted.
Health care professionals treating patients with this
illness have learned that transmission arises from contact
with bodily fluids of a person who is symptomatic—that
is, has a fever, vomiting, diarrhea, and malaise. We have
very strong reason to believe that transmission occurs
when the viral load in bodily fluids is high, on the order
of millions of virions per microliter. This recognition
has led to the dictum that an asymptomatic person is not
contagious; field experience in West Africa has shown
that conclusion to be valid.48
Ebola can incubate inside the body of a person it infects for as long
as twenty-one days without the person experiencing even a fever, 49 let
alone the bleeding, vomiting, and diarrhea that poses a risk to others.50
44

See A. Elisha & B. Adegboro, Ebola Virus Diseases, 15(3) AFR. J. CLN. & EXPER.
MICROBIO. 117, 117-118 (2014).
45
2,387 cases resulted from the first twenty-four outbreaks, which is just the sum of
the confirmed cases reported by WHO for those previous cases. See id. Another 13,855
confirmed cases have resulted from the current outbreak in three West African nations.
2014 Ebola Outbreak in West African—Case Counts, CDC (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html [hereinafter
Case Counts]. The sum of the confirmed case counts from the 2014 outbreak and those
from the prior twenty-four outbreaks is 16,242.
46
See Case Counts, supra note 45 (reporting 22,525 suspected, probable and
confirmed cases).
47
See CDC, Facts about Ebola in the U.S., supra note 18.
48
Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029
(2014) (emphasis added).
49
Raykar et al., supra note 37, at 494 (Ebola incubation period is two to twenty-one
days).
50
Drazen et al, supra note 48, at 2029 (“[W]e now know that fever precedes the
contagious stage, allowing workers who are unknowingly infected to identify themselves
before they become a threat to their community. This understanding is based on more
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That is why a person infected with—but asymptomatic for—Ebola is not
infectious to others. In short, somewhere between 16,242 and 25,000
Ebola cases over nearly forty years reveal, without exception, that one
who is infected with the virus is not contagious until signs of sickness
appear.
Given these facts about Ebola transmission, the Guidance’s
recommendation that health officials prohibit a person who does not have
symptoms of the illness from coming within three feet of another person
for the twenty-one day incubation period of the virus is plainly irrational.
It guards against a form of transmission, the risk of which is so
infinitesimally small as to be unprecedented in the decades-long human
history of this virus. Moreover, in doing so, the Guidance ignores
conclusions that can be drawn reliably from thousands—even tens of
thousands—of cases.
It should come as no surprise then that the state court judge in Maine
summarily denied the petition seeking an order to quarantine Nurse
Hickox, which was based on the scientifically unfounded
recommendation in the CDC’s Guidance to separate from others
individuals who are not contagious. As the next section explains, any
public health official ordering the quarantine of an asymptomatic person
exposed to Ebola is almost surely violating state quarantine law and is
certainly violating the federal Constitution.

C. THE LAW
Every state, as a vestige of its original sovereignty, retains its police
power, 51 which authorizes states to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of its citizenry by, among other things, enacting quarantine laws.52 In
fact, every state has enacted some form of quarantine law. 53 As a
condition of quarantining an individual, states’ laws typically require

than clinical observation: the sensitive blood polymerase-chain-reaction (PCR) test for
Ebola is often negative on the day when fever or other symptoms begin and only
becomes reliably positive 2 to 3 days after symptom onset.”).
51
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“the police power [is] a
power which the State did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under
the Constitution”).
52
See id. (explaining that the police power includes the authority of a state to regulate
for the purpose of protecting the public health and safety, and it includes the power to
enact quarantine laws).
53
See TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH, STATE QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION LAWS (2004),
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror04/Quarantine.pdf; see also MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/
MSEHPA.pdf.
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public health officials to obtain a court order authorizing such action.54
Moreover, states’ laws commonly prohibit a court from issuing a
quarantine order unless the state puts forth evidence that the person who
would be subject to the order poses a health risk to the population and
that it is necessary to quarantine that person in order to protect the public
from this risk. 55
By recommending that state and local health officials quarantine
individuals exposed to Ebola but who show no signs of illness, the
Guidance is setting up health officials for failure under many states’
laws. As established above, a person exposed to Ebola who has no
symptoms of the disease cannot infect others with the virus, not even if
we somehow knew that the person was incubating the virus.
Consequently, asymptomatic individuals do not “pose a risk” of
spreading Ebola to others, and, therefore, it is not “necessary” to
quarantine those individuals in order to protect the public’s health.
Because the burden falls on the state to establish the existence of a “risk”
of contagion as well as the “necessity” of quarantine, health officials
simply cannot prevail when pursuing an order to quarantine an
asymptomatic person exposed to Ebola.
This is exactly why a judge in Maine denied the State’s petition to
quarantine Kaci Hickox. Under Maine law, a court may not issue a
quarantine order unless, “based upon clear and convincing evidence, the
court finds that a public health threat exists . . . ,” and, even then, the
court may order only “the least restrictive measures necessary to
effectively protect the public health.”56 In Hickox’s case, health officials
admitted in the petition that “[i]ndividuals infected with Ebola Virus
Disease who are not showing symptoms are not yet infectious,” 57 and
that Nurse Hickox showed no symptoms. 58 Given Maine law and these
facts, the Court had no choice but to reject the portion of the petition
seeking to prohibit Nurse Hickox from coming within three feet of
anyone else for the remainder of the twenty-one day incubation period.
The judge wrote: “According to the information presented to the court,
Respondent [Hickox] currently does not show any symptoms of Ebola
54
See id.; see TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH, supra note 53, at 14. In some states, health
officials must obtain an initial temporary quarantine order from a court, which can be
obtained on an ex parte basis, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 250-2 (2014), while in other
states, health officials may act initially on their own authority to quarantine an individual
temporarily so long as officials pursue a court order in support of the quarantine within a
short period of time, e.g., MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605.
55
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 605; TRUST FOR AM. HEALTH,
supra note 53.
56
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 812-1 (2014).
57
Petition, supra note 9, ¶ 14.
58
See id. ¶ 27.
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and is therefore not infectious.” 59 Consequently, the court held that “[t]he
State has not met its burden at this time to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that limiting Respondent’s movements to the degree requested
is ‘necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of
infection’ . . . .” 60
Even if health officials or a court were to issue an order under a
state’s law prohibiting an asymptomatic individual from coming within
three feet of another person, it would almost certainly be set aside as
violating the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the federal
Constitution. The clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law . . . .” 61 The Supreme
Court of the United States has interpreted this language to protect
individuals from deprivations of liberty by a state where such state action
lacks sufficient substantive justification; the purpose is to prevent
governments from acting arbitrarily. 62 In particular, when state action
deprives someone of a “fundamental liberty interest,” the state carries a
burden to prove that its action is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.” 63 Fundamental liberty interests are those that are “‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed,’” 64 and they include freedom from physical
restraint or confinement 65 for the purpose of protecting the public’s
health. 66
As applied here, there is no doubt that prohibiting an asymptomatic
individual from traveling, working, being in public places, or otherwise
coming within three feet of another person imposes a substantial physical
restraint on that individual to the point of constituting confinement. In
other words, such a prohibition deprives the individual of a fundamental
liberty interest. Thus, the state would be required to prove that such a
59

Order Pending Hearing, supra note 10, at 3.
Id.
61
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”).
63
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
64
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
65
See id. at 719; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (addressing
claims of an insanity aquitee to be discharged from confinement, the Court said
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”).
66
See e.g., Best v. St. Vincent Hosp., No. 03-0365, 2003 WL 21518829 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (applying strict scrutiny to New York City’s action to isolate a tuberculosis patient
until he completed treatment), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded in part sub nom
Best v. Bellvue Hosp., 115 Fed. Appx. 459 (2d. Cir. 2004).
60
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physical restraint is narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling
interest in protecting the public from the spread of Ebola. A quarantine
order is not “narrowly tailored” to the state’s interest if there exists a less
restrictive alternative that will also serve the state’s interest in preventing
the spread of an infectious disease. 67 Where the government’s interest is
in protecting the public from becoming infected with Ebola by a person
who has been exposed to the virus but who does not have any symptoms
of illness, there are far less restrictive alternatives to a near-absolute
quarantine. An asymptomatic person is not infectious to others, so the
state’s interest is served by regularly monitoring to determine whether
and, if so, when the person develops symptoms of illness, which would
indicate that the individual had become infectious and must be isolated
from others. 68 Because the public’s health can be protected from the
spread of Ebola in the case of an asymptomatic person by court-ordered
monitoring, which is much less restrictive than a near-absolute
quarantine, a federal court would surely rule that quarantining an
asymptomatic person is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest
in preventing the spread of this virus. Consequently, the order would be
set aside as unconstitutional.
In the end, both the science and the law quite clearly indicate just
how poorly conceived the movement restrictions recommended in the
Guidance really are. They cannot be justified by the science of Ebola
transmission, and so they cannot be enforced by law. The CDC has
highly skilled scientists who specialize in infectious diseases, and it has
many highly skilled lawyers. It is extraordinarily unlikely, then, that the
agency was not aware of the substantial shortcomings of the Guidance
67

See id. at *7-8 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)) (“Even [when]
the governmental purpose [is] legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”).
68
In making the determination that quarantine is not narrowly tailored to the state’s
interest in preventing the spread of Ebola, a federal court is likely to defer to the
judgments of health officials only if they are based on current medical knowledge
about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b)
the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the
severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d)
the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm.
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 274 (1987). Although Arline
concerned a claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court’s
logic about the standard of review it would apply to medical findings concerning the
transmission of contagious diseases is applicable in the realm of substantive due process.
See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV.
933, 937-42 (1989).
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when applied to asymptomatic individuals who have been exposed to
Ebola. What then explains the CDC’s decision to include in its Guidance
that those individuals be subject to such extreme restrictions on their
movements? That question is addressed in the next section.

D. THE GUIDANCE IN CONTEXT
The short and recent history of Ebola in America is one of mounting
fear and finger-pointing at the CDC. It began in September 2014, when
Thomas Eric Duncan, a Liberian visiting family in Dallas, Texas, was
diagnosed with Ebola. 69 It peaked a month later when a physician, Craig
Spencer, who had treated Ebola patients in West Africa was admitted to
a New York City hospital with the disease after having spent the
previous week out among New Yorkers eating in restaurants, bowling,
and riding the subway. 70 In between, two nurses contracted Ebola as a
result of caring for Duncan in a Dallas hospital, despite efforts to follow
CDC protocol. 71 Moreover, one of the nurses traveled on a commercial
flight while she had a low-grade fever indicating the onset of Ebola
symptoms, and the CDC did not prohibit her from doing so even after the
nurse notified the CDC of her fever. 72 Each of these events belied
statements from CDC Director Tom Frieden that the U.S. was prepared
to “stop Ebola in its tracks” when it entered the country. 73 Consequently,
the CDC and its director came under fire for its missteps and perceived
failure to protect Americans adequately. 74
The CDC issued its Guidance in the heat of these events and
criticism. Accordingly, we cannot fully appreciate the rationale for the
seemingly unscientific recommendations the Guidance makes without
analyzing them in this context. Doing so allows for an educated guess
that the CDC recommended the quarantine of non-infectious individuals
both because it could not rule out the theoretical possibility that an
asymptomatic person incubating Ebola could infect another person and,
more importantly, because the agency could not take the political
69
Sydney Lupkin, Ebola in America: Timeline of the Deadly Virus, ABC NEWS (Nov.
17, 2014, 11:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ebola-america-timeline/story?id=
26159719 [hereinafter Lupkin, Timeline].
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Tom Frieden, Why U.S. Can Stop Ebola in its Tracks, CNN (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:43 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/02/opinion/frieden-ebola-first-patient/.
74
See, e.g., Jennifer Haberkorn & Lauren French, CDC Director in Hot Zone at Ebola
Hill Hearing, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/
10/hearing-will-have-public-health-officials-grilled-on-ebola-111943.html.
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embarrassment of yet another mistake. All of this is described in greater
detail in this section, which proceeds chronologically through the key
events.

1. Thomas Eric Duncan
Thomas Eric Duncan arrived in the U.S. on September 20, 2014, to
reunite with and marry the mother of his 16-year-old son. 75 Shortly
before leaving Liberia, he had helped transport a sick, pregnant woman
to and from a local hospital. 76 At one point, he carried her from his car to
her house. 77 She died from Ebola the next morning, but it is unclear
whether Duncan understood what she had died from when he left for the
U.S. four days later. 78 He was screened by officials before boarding his
international flight. 79 At the time, his temperature was normal. 80 He also
reported, errantly, that he had not had any recent contact with an Ebola
victim. 81
On September 25, Duncan went to Texas Presbyterian Hospital in
Dallas, where he told a nurse that he had a fever and that he had recently
traveled to the U.S. from Liberia.82 Based on this information alone, his
treating physician should have recognized the possibility of an Ebola
infection and isolated him. Instead, the physician at the hospital sent him
home with some antibiotics. 83 Duncan’s symptoms progressed, and he
returned to the hospital much sicker several days later.84 He was then
admitted and isolated, and the diagnosis of Ebola was first made on
September 28. 85 On October 8, Duncan died. 86
When the news reported that Ebola had entered the U.S. and that the
country’s first Ebola patient was being treated in a Dallas hospital, Dr.
Tom Frieden held a press conference where he famously said, “We will
75

Anna Almendrala, What We Know About Thomas Eric Duncan, The First Ebola
Patient Diagnosed in the U.S., HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/06/thomas-eric-duncan-dallas-ebola-patientus_n_5942150.html.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Alana Horowitz et al., Thomas Eric Duncan Dead; Dallas Ebola Patient Had Been
Critically Ill, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/10/08/thomas-eric-duncan-dead-ebola-dallas_n_5952502.html.
85
Almendrala, supra note 75.
86
Horowitz, supra note 84.
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stop it in its tracks, because we’ve got infection control in hospitals and
public health that tracks and isolates people if they get symptoms.” 87 As
events unfolded, however, it became apparent that infection control in
the hospital treating Duncan was not working as it should.

2. Nurses Pham and Vinson
Nina Pham and Amber Vinson are nurses at the hospital that treated
Thomas Eric Duncan.88 Both cared for him while he was in the throes of
the illness, changing his sheets, washing him, and mopping his floors.89
They each wore protective gear including gloves, suits, and masks, and
they used a buddy system both to put on and take off their equipment
each shift. 90 Neither can identify a time when they breached CDC
protocol for the use of personal protective equipment by health care
workers treating Ebola patients.91 At most, they noted that the hospital
did not initially have the head gear and positive-pressure suits used by
caretakers at Emory University. 92
Despite their best efforts to follow then-current CDC protocol, both
Nurse Pham and Nurse Vinson became infected with Ebola. Nurse Pham
was the first to develop a fever on October 11, and she went straight to
the hospital after notifying public health officials. 93 Nurse Vinson
entered the hospital three days later, also with a fever. 94 Each was later
transferred to other facilities more experienced in the care of Ebola
patients. Pham went to the National Institutes of Health in Maryland, and
Vinson went to Emory University Hospital. 95 Both were nursed through
their illnesses, survived, and were discharged.96
The CDC was criticized intensely as soon as the nurses were
diagnosed with Ebola. 97 Dr. Frieden had assured America that hospitals
were prepared to prevent the spread of Ebola, and yet two nurses were
87
Mikayla Bouchard, CDC Head Frieden on Ebola in America: ‘We Will Stop It In Its
Tracks’, ABC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014, 2:18 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/cdc-headfrieden-ebola-america-stop-tracks/story?id=25975221.
88
How Did Dallas Nurses Catch Ebola?, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/10/15/how-did-dallas-nurses-catchebola/x8olat9b0m4dRKSyxkVtUM/story.html.
89
Id.; see also The Ebola Warriors, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Dec. 28, 2014), available
at http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/texan-of-the-year-2014/.
90
DALL. MORNING NEWS, supra note 89.
91
BOS. GLOBE, supra note 88.
92
DALL. MORNING NEWS, supra note 89.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See id.
97
Haberkorn & French, supra note 74.
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infected. Moreover, in what could be viewed as an admission that the
agency’s Ebola infection-control policies and procedures were
insufficient, the CDC issued a new protocol instructing health care
workers how to best protect themselves from infection when caring for
Ebola patients, which called for enhanced forms of personal protective
equipment. 98
To make matters worse, the CDC did not stop Nurse Vinson from
boarding a commercial flight even after she informed the agency that she
had a low-grade fever a day after Nurse Pham had been hospitalized with
then-suspected Ebola. 99 Later, CDC officials admitted that the agency
should have instructed Vinson not to board the plane when she reported a
slight fever. 100 As result of this blunder, the CDC contacted each of the
more than 130 passengers on that flight to determine which of them, if
any, required active monitoring. 101 All of this happened at a time when
health officials were already monitoring more than 100 other Americans
who had treated, lived with, or otherwise come into contact with Thomas
Eric Duncan or any other U.S. victim of Ebola.102
At this point, Congress, if not the public, lost confidence in the
CDC’s ability to protect Americans. Some Republican legislators called
for Dr. Frieden’s resignation as Director of the CDC. 103 The Speaker of
the House urged the Obama Administration to restrict air travel to the
U.S. from the West African nations where Ebola was widespread. 104 One
Republican Senator announced that he would bypass the Administration
and introduce a bill to ban the issuance of visas to foreign nationals from
any of those West African nations. 105 Even Democrats were highly
98

Lisa Schnirring, CDC Unveils New PPE Guidance for Ebola, UNV. OF MINN. CRT.
INFECTIOUS
DISEASE
RESEARCH
&
POLICY
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/10/cdc-unveils-new-ppe-guidanceebola; CDC Tightened Guidance for U.S. Healthcare Workers on Personal Protective
Equipment for Ebola, CDC (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/
fs1020-ebola-personal-protective-equipment.html.
99
Haberkorn & French, supra note 74; see also Lupkin, Timeline, supra note 69.
100
Will Dunham, U.S. Lawmakers Blast Government’s Ebola Response, Urge Travel
Ban, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2014, 7:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/16/ushealth-ebola-usa-idUSKCN0I517E20141016.
101
See Timothy Williams, Ebola-Infected Health Worker in Dallas Took a Flight on
Monday, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/
us/ebola-infected-dallas-health-worker-was-on-flight.html.
102
See id.
103
See Dunham, supra note 100.
104
Id.
105
Press Release, Office of U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, Rubio Announces Legislation to
Impose Temporary Visa Ban on Ebola Affected Countries (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.
rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/10/rubio-announces-legislation-to-imposetemporary-visa-ban-on-ebola-affected-countries.
FOR
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critical. The ranking Democrat on a House subcommittee before which
Dr. Frieden testified said, “It would be an understatement to say that the
response to the first U.S.-based patient with Ebola has been mismanaged,
causing risk to scores of additional people.” 106

3. Dr. Craig Spencer and Nurse Kaci Hickox
Things went from bad to worse on October 23, 2014, when it was
reported that a physician, Craig Spencer, who had treated Ebola patients
in West Africa, was admitted to Bellevue Hospital in New York City
after reporting to health officials that he had developed a fever and
gastrointestinal symptoms. 107 Dr. Spencer had returned to his home in
New York from Guinea six days earlier. 108 During those six days, he had
not been monitored by health officials 109; rather, he had been taking his
own temperature twice a day and watching for any sign of a fever, which
was consistent with the instructions he had been given by Doctors
Without Borders—the medical relief organization through which he had
volunteered to treat Ebola patients in Guinea.110
Alarming to many, however, was that Dr. Spencer, while infected
with Ebola, had been out in public in New York City during those six
days before he experienced symptoms of the illness. 111
[H]e traveled to Manhattan’s Highline Park and a
popular restaurant called The Meatball Shop on
Tuesday. The next day, he took a 3-mile run along
Riverside Park and traveled on the subway to Brooklyn,

106

Dunham, supra note 100.
Lupkin, Timeline, supra note 69.
108
See id.
109
Dr. Spencer entered the country through JFK International Airport on Oct. 17, 2014,
Sydney Lupkin, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, Toughen Ebola Quarantine Rules After
Doctor Case, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/york-doctorebola-quarantine/story?id=26431431 [hereinafter Lupkin, States Toughen], which was
five days before CDC instituted a new policy of requiring that all travelers entering the
U.S from any West African nation where Ebola was widespread be monitored by public
health officials. See CDC Press Release, CDC Announces Active Post-Arrival
Monitoring for Travelers from Impacted Countries (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2014/p1022-post-arrival-monitoring.html. Thus, Dr. Spencer was not
subject to this new policy having entered the country before it had been announced. This
change in policy occurred the day before Dr. Spencer experienced his first symptoms and
was admitted to the hospital with Ebola.
110
Lupkin, States Toughen, supra note 109.
111
Id.
107
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where he went bowling. He was fatigued, but had no
fever, officials said. 112
On October 24, the day after Craig Spencer entered the hospital with
Ebola and in direct response to the public fear his story triggered, several
states took matters into their own hands. Rather than follow the CDC’s
lead of permitting travelers returning home from West Africa to go out in
public even if they had had contact with someone sick with Ebola, New
Jersey, New York, and Illinois instituted policies to quarantine all such
travelers—regardless of symptoms—until the twenty-one day incubation
period for Ebola had elapsed for each of them. 113 Governors Christie and
Cuomo defended their tough new policies, saying “[w]e are no longer
relying on C.D.C. standards” because a “voluntary Ebola quarantine is
not enough.” 114
Nurse Hickox landed at Newark Liberty International Airport the
very day after New Jersey instituted its new policy of mandatory
quarantine. 115 She became the first person subjected to mandatory
quarantine of travelers from an Ebola-ridden country. 116 It triggered a
stand-off between the Obama Administration, which rebuked states that
instituted mandatory quarantine for overreacting and potentially
undermining Ebola relief efforts, and the governors of those states, who
raised concerns that the federal government’s response to Ebola was
insufficient to protect the public’s health.117 As described in the
introduction to this article, New Jersey officials released Hickox from
her quarantine two days later on October 27, after she agreed to travel by
private means directly to her home state of Maine, where, as we know,
she then fought the efforts of that state to quarantine her.

112

Id.
Id.
114
Marc Santora, First Patient Quarantined Under Strict New Policy Test Negative for
Ebola, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/
nyregion/new-york-ebola-case-craig-spencer.html?&hp&action=click&pgtype=
Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.
nav=top-news.
115
Sam Frizell, First Ebola Worker Quarantined Under New Policy Tests Negative,
TIME (Oct. 25, 2014), available at http://time.com/3538834/ebola-quarantine-new-york/.
116
Id.
117
See David Martosko, Chris Christie Insists He DIDN’T Do U-turn Under Pressure
From Obama After Ebola Nurse is Allowed to Leave New Jersey Hospital Quarantine
Test to Return to Maine, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 25, 2014), available at http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-2808178/Obama-forces-Chris-Christie-U-turn-allow-Ebola-nurseleave-quarantine-tent.html (“‘Illinois has since adopted this policy, so has now the state
of Maryland.’ [Gov. Christie] said. ‘So I’m telling you guys this is going to become a
national policy eventually. Eventually the CDC will come around.’”).
113
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4. Theoretical Risks of Transmission
During this same timeline, news outlets reported that scientists had
not ruled out the possibility that Ebola is transmissible through coughing
and sneezing. 118 Nor could they rule out the possibility that
asymptomatic individuals might shed some virus cells before developing
significant symptoms. 119 These reports were based on statements from
scientists that laboratory data had not eliminated the theoretical risk of
Ebola transmission through a cough or sneeze droplet or the theoretical
risk that an asymptomatic person with a non-zero viral load could
transmit Ebola to another person. Moreover, there is at least one
coincidence suggesting that the CDC felt compelled to account for these
statements about theoretical risks from scientists. The agency, at about
the same time that it issued its Guidance, also updated its web-based
FAQs concerning Ebola transmission via coughing or sneezing. 120 The
new version clarified that “[t]here is no evidence indicating that Ebola
virus is spread by coughing or sneezing,” 121 which is different from
saying definitively that the virus cannot be spread that way.
All of this together describes the context in which the CDC made its
recommendation in the Guidance to severely restrict the movements of
asymptomatic individuals like Nurse Hickox. The agency acted in the
midst of fear that, without mandatory quarantine, health care workers
incubating Ebola, like Craig Spencer, would be out in public and
somehow spread the virus. It acted in the midst of fear that Kaci Hickox
might be another Craig Spencer. Furthermore, it issued the Guidance at a
time when public attention was focusing on theoretical rather than actual
risks, and when confidence in the CDC was at a low point given the
mistakes and policy shifts it had made during the crisis.
Viewed from this perspective, it seems plausible that the CDC would
issue a policy to account for theoretical risks that science had yet to ruleout, and not simply the known risks that science and field experience
confirmed as true. With its credibility substantially damaged by its
earlier blunders and mistaken predictions, the agency might have
118

David Willman, Some Ebola Experts Worry Virus May Spread More Easily Than
Assumed, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014), available at http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-naebola-questions-20141007-story.html#page=1; Jon Greenberg, George Will Says a
Sneeze or Cough Could Spread Ebola, POLITIFACT (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/oct/19/george-will/george-willclaims-sneeze-cough-spread-ebola/.
119
Willman, supra note 118.
120
Arthur Delaney, CDC Removed Info On Coughing and Sneezing from Ebola Q&A
(UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/
30/cdc-ebola_n_6078072.html.
121
Id.
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rationalized that it was necessary to accommodate public fear by
recommending severe “movement restrictions” for asymptomatic
individuals with at least “some risk” of developing Ebola. The CDC may
have convinced itself that this would prevent another embarrassment and
thereby preserve its ability to set policy throughout the crisis.
Of course, this is merely an educated guess based on information that
is publically available. Perhaps hardball politics was going on behind
closed doors, which has yet to come to light. In any case, the story of the
CDC’s Guidance, and of the events that preceded it, is a cautionary tale
of how even the most authoritative public health agency can go wrong
when it makes policy divorced from science. It demonstrates how expert
administrators with impeccable credentials and the best of intentions can
make public health policy that accommodates public fear at the expense
of science. The next and final section of this article examines the price
we pay when that happens.

E. THE MANY COSTS OF ACCOMMODATING FEAR IN PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICY
A fundamental principle of public health practice is that policy must
be grounded in science. It is embedded in Dr. Frieden’s practice,
described in the epigraph of this article, to “base it all on data.” 122
Regardless of the underlying reason (or rationalization), the CDC’s
recommendation in its Guidance that asymptomatic individuals exposed
to Ebola patients while in West Africa be prohibited from coming within
three feet of another person for the twenty-one day incubation period of
the virus breached this core principle. As demonstrated by almost forty
years of experience, encompassing twenty-five Ebola outbreaks, and
somewhere between 16,000 and 25,000 human cases, asymptomatic
individuals incubating Ebola do not pose a risk of transmission to
others. 123 Consequently, subjecting them to a near-absolute quarantine
does not serve a public health purpose. Instead, it accommodates and
exacerbates public fear, deprives some individuals of their right to move
about freely, and sets a dangerous example for ignoring science. Each of
these comes at a high cost, and some of those costs are apparent from our
recent experience with Ebola.
As others have noted, one cost of unnecessary restrictions on the
liberty of those who travel to West Africa to care for Ebola patients is
122
Jon Schuppe, CDC Chief Tom Frieden Confronts Ebola Crisis Cool and Collected,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/
cdc-chief-tom-frieden-confronts-ebola-crisis-cool-collected-n175351.
123
See supra text accompanying notes 44–46.
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that such a policy discourages health care workers from volunteering to
provide such treatment. 124 The medical relief organization, Doctors
Without Borders, for which both Craig Spencer and Kaci Hickox
volunteered, reported in late October 2014 that it had already seen the
“chilling effect” that a threat of quarantine and similar restrictions were
having on its volunteers. 125 Anxiety and confusion among workers over
quarantine laws caused the organization to consider shortening stays in
West Africa so as to accommodate the twenty-one days a worker might
need to remain away from family and co-workers after returning
home. 126
Imposing additional burdens on individuals who would otherwise
fight the spread of Ebola at its source is not only unfair to health care
workers volunteering their services at great personal risk, but it also
increases the risk that the disease spreads. Like a wildfire, an infectious
disease will spread if not contained. 127 Thus, the best way to protect the
population of the U.S. against Ebola is to contain it and stop it in West
Africa. That, of course, requires willing volunteer health care workers to
travel abroad to take up the fight.
Additionally, when the CDC accommodates public fear by
recommending a near-absolute quarantine of health care workers
returning from West Africa, it creates cover for others to do the same.
The Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
announced a policy in late October to quarantine all military personnel
for twenty-one days when they return from service in any of the three
West African nations where Ebola was widespread. 128 This tremendous
waste of financial and military resources was designed to comfort
military personnel and their families against the fear that somehow an
asymptomatic soldier might infect a loved one with Ebola back home. 129
Once the precedent is set for accommodating irrational public fear
over the transmission of Ebola from asymptomatic individuals, it is
124

Drazen, supra note 48, at 2029.
Jonathan Allen, U.S. Quarantines ‘Chilling’ Ebola Fight in West Africa: MSF,
REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/31/us-health-ebolausa-msf-idUSKBN0IJ2PR20141031.
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difficult to contain. It imposes a social, if not a legal, obligation on health
care workers to quarantine themselves rather than risk being perceived as
irresponsible. 130 Likewise, it puts political pressure on state politicians to
out-do each other in the name of soothing public fear and comforting
their constituents. As one newspaper headline put it, “Is Your State
Quarantining Ebola Doctors?” 131 The accompanying article stated that
“[s]everal governors in tough reelection fights are rejecting CDC’s Ebola
Guidelines in favor of more draconian rules.” 132
Discrimination against those associated with Ebola is an even uglier
cost to accommodating irrational public fear about transmission of the
disease. Here are just a few examples of Ebola discrimination in the U.S.
Officials in several states excluded teachers and students from
classrooms merely because they or someone they live with traveled to
West Africa. 133 Health care workers who had treated Ebola patients in
Atlanta, New York, and Dallas lost moonlighting jobs, were denied
service in local businesses, and had their children turned away from day
care for fear that they posed a danger. 134 School-aged brothers from
Senegal, living in the U.S., were beaten by classmates yelling “Ebola.” 135
Certainly, there would be cases of discrimination regardless of whether
the CDC accommodated public fear through its Guidance, but we must
130

See Rebecca Martinez & Eric Hodge, North Carolina Doctor in Voluntary
Quarantine After Returning from Liberia Aid Mission, WUNC (Jan 7, 2015), http://wunc.
org/post/north-carolina-doctor-voluntary-quarantine-after-returning-liberian-aid-mission?
utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=FBWUNC4651.
131
Sam Baker & Sophie Novack, Is Your State Quarantining Ebola Doctors?, NAT.
JOURNAL (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/is-your-statequarantining-ebola-doctors-20141030.
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., Connecticut School Lifts Ban on Girl Barred Over Ebola Fears, REUTERS
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/31/us-health-ebola-usa-schoolidUSKBN0IK01P20141031); see Aimee Jones, Newton High School Teacher Removed
From School Until She is Medically Cleared for Ebola, NEWTON CITIZEN (Oct. 29, 2014),
available
at
http://www.newtoncitizen.com/news/2014/oct/29/newton-high-schoolteacher-removed-from-school/); see also Amanda Terkel, Oklahoma Teacher Will Have
To Quarantine Herself After Trip to Ebola-Free Rwanda, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/28/ebola-rwanda-oklahoma-teacher_n_
6062726.html); see also Allison Ross, Teacher Leaves Catholic School Amid Ebola
Fears, COURIER-JOURNAL (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://www.courier-journal.com/
story/news/education/2014/11/03/louisville-catholic-teacher-resigns-amidst-ebola-fears/
18417299/.
134
Anemona Hartocollis & Nate Schweber, Bellevue Employees Face Ebola at Work,
and Stigma of It Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/10/30/nyregion/bellevue-workers-worn-out-from-treating-ebolapatient-face-stigma-outside-hospital.html?_r=4.
135
Elizabeth Barber, 2 Kids from Senegal Were Beaten Up in NYC by Classmates
Yelling ‘Ebola’, TIME (Oct. 28, 2014), available at http://time.com/3542955/senegalkids-brothers-assaulted-ebola-bronx-tremont-school-new-york-city-pabe-amadou-drame/.

2015]

EBOLA, QUARANTINE, AND FLAWED CDC POLICY

25

assume that cases of discrimination increase significantly when the
nation’s leading public health authority suggests that there is reason to
fear that we might catch Ebola even from those who do not appear to be
sick.
Finally, when the CDC, through the Guidance, ignores the facts
about Ebola transmission, it erodes confidence in science, which makes
the work of protecting the public’s health all the more difficult. Consider
the latest measles outbreak in the U.S. From January 1 through April 3,
2015, there were 159 cases of measles spanning eighteen states and the
District of Columbia. 136 The recent resurgence of measles in the U.S. is
often blamed on parents who ignore the scientific facts about the risks
and benefits of the measles vaccine.137 How can the CDC or any public
health agency blatantly ignore the science of Ebola transmission, and
then urge American parents to set aside their unfounded fear and trust the
science behind the measles vaccine?
In the face of both widespread fear over Ebola in the U.S. and the
CDC’s damaged credibility following several early mistakes, it might
have been a near impossible task for the agency to fend-off its critics and
hold public health policy accountable strictly to the science of Ebola
transmission. But that is the fight the CDC should have taken up. Instead,
by issuing its deeply flawed Guidance, the agency ignored its bedrock
responsibility and, as a result, undermined the public’s health.
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